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Abstract
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) continues to plague health-oriented government regulation. This is 
particularly reflected in recent challenges to tobacco control measures through bilateral investment agreements. 
There are numerous reform proposals circulating within the public health community. However, I suggest that 
perhaps it is time for the community to explore a stronger position on ISDS. I draw from mounting evidence 
on the problematic uses of the ISDS to explore the proposition that ISDS is no longer justified. I tackle the 
normative question of should the ISDS system persist and point out that the ISDS system is not justifiable from 
a development perspective and because of its nefarious use, is of no added value to a system that could rely on 
domestic courts.
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Introduction
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions have 
existed since the 1960s. However, it was not until 1987 that the 
first dispute was filed. Since then there has been an explosion 
in the number of cases. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2016 
World Investment Report, a record 70 disputes were initiated 
in 2015, bringing the total number of known disputes to 696.1 
The ISDS provision is designed to provide an added level of 
security to protect investors from expropriation (direct and 
indirect), nationalization and other forms of discrimination. It 
is argued that this protection is needed in countries with weak 
rule of law and unpredictable political orders; a transnational 
safety valve. From this perspective the ISDS provision is viewed 
as a valuable tool to attract foreign investment and protect 
investors in “risky” environments. Despite the apparent virtues 
of ISDS it has become one of the most controversial aspects of 
the international investment regime. The problems with ISDS 
are conditioned by the rapid rise in the number of international 
investment agreements (IIAs) in the past two decades. As 
of 2015, there were 3304 IIAs in existence.1 Each agreement 
provides a unique forum for investors to file a dispute. The 
rapid and sustained rise in the number of challenges and the 
nature of these challenges is what is so troubling. It is not 
surprising that Labonté and colleagues have identified ISDS 
as one of the pressing potential risks embedded in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).2 Unlike the authors, I suggest 
that perhaps it is time for the health community to explore 
a stronger position on ISDS. I draw from mounting evidence 
on the problematic uses of the ISDS to explore the proposition 
that ISDS is no longer justified. In arguing this controversial 
point, I recognize that there are numerous major obstacles 
to realizing this position. Most commentators have chosen 
a more path dependent approach. They recognize that the 
system is broken, even fundamentally flawed, but acquiesce to 
the fact that ISDS is so embedded in the economic landscape 
that one must accept that, at least in the medium-term, the 
system will persist. I tackle the normative question of should 
the ISDS system persist and point out that the ISDS system is 
not justifiable from a development perspective and because of 
its nefarious use, is of no added value to a system that could 
rely on domestic courts. 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Development
To begin, there is mixed evidence to support the hypothesis 
that investment agreements do indeed lead to greater foreign 
investment, which is arguably the central purpose of such 
agreements.3,4 Not surprisingly, evidence suggests that 
the domestic institutional environment (eg, low levels of 
corruption, strong property rights protection) is a key factor 
in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).5 Rose-Ackerman 
and Tobin found that investment agreements only had a 
positive impact on facilitating investment in stable rule-of-law 
countries, which contradicts the logic that ISDS will facilitate 
investment in low rule-of-law countries.6 Even where risk of 
expropriation reduces investment there is evidence to suggest 
that other factors such as foreign aid can mitigate the adverse 
effect of this risk.7 Market openness and investment incentives 
are also found to play a key role in attracting investment 
independent of international agreements. Not surprisingly 
the potential for profit, through such aspects as commodity 
price, plays a powerful role independent of the institutional 
environment. Lee provides a dramatic example of how 
commodity price (ie, oil price) can even be increased due to 
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unstable political contexts (ie, conflict) inducing investment.8 
Together this evidence supports one commentators point that 
“if host countries are committed to trying to attract more FDI, 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have not provided a short-
cut from the need to implement broader reforms of domestic 
institutions.”9 The fact that FDI does not hinge on investment 
agreements undercuts the argument that ISDS is necessary for 
economic development. 
Nefarious Use of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
It is true that the ISDS system does provide a venue for investors 
to seek compensation for expropriation, nationalization or 
other discriminatory practices. However, because abuses of the 
system are almost impossible to control it can be argued that the 
costs outweigh the benefits. This point is particularly salient in 
light of the fact that investors will likely keep investing in the 
absence of ISDS due to factors presented above. To examine 
cost, it is important to examine the nature of the investor-state 
disputes. Pelc analyzed claims filed between 1993 and 2015.10 
He found that: 
“Most disputes today are not over direct takings, but over 
indirect expropriation. And most respondent-countries are 
not rent-seeking regimes with low rule-of-law, but stable 
democracies with independent judiciaries. To put it in 
stark terms, the greatest portion of legal challenges in the 
investment regime today seek monetary compensation for 
regulatory measures implemented by democracies” (p 2).
In this timeframe, only 17% of ISDS claims were filed because 
of direct expropriation. This pattern points to the fact that the 
ISDS system is primarily being used to challenge government 
regulation. For example, of the 70 cases brought forward in 
2015, more than 20 were brought against legislative reforms in 
the renewable energy sector alone.1 
This evidence supports the criticisms of ISDS voiced by the 
public health community which rest on the claim that firms 
are using ISDS to challenge legitimate regulatory measures.11,12 
They further argue that these cases are being filed not with the 
ultimate goal to gain compensation but to discourage other 
countries from imposing such measures (otherwise referred 
to as “regulatory chill”).13 Pelc finds that investors only win 
10% of indirect expropriation claims when brought against 
democratic countries, which suggests that, if firms are truly 
rational entities, cases are being brought forward to achieve 
peripheral objectives. For example, Pelc notes that these cases 
rarely reach a settlement and are widely publicized meaning 
that firms want to extend the length of the dispute and 
publicize the process in order to signal to other countries that 
a similar protracted legal dispute awaits them if they choose 
to regulate.10 These findings align well with recent cases filed 
by tobacco firms under the ISDS system. For example, Philip 
Morris challenged Australia’s standardized tobacco packaging 
legislation using a BIT signed between Hong Kong and 
Australia. Philip Morris Asia had restructured its ownership to 
establish its presence in Hong Kong, in what appeared to be a 
maneuver to utilize the BIT as a forum to file a dispute against 
Australia. The tribunal recognized this maneuver as such and 
dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. Another case 
filed by Philip Morris International (PMI) against Uruguay 
in 2010 was finally resolved in favor of Uruguay in 2016 and 
even though PMI lost the case, the monetary cost incurred by 
Uruguay prior to the decision was substantial. The cost was so 
significant that international civil society organizations rallied 
to generate a legal fund, to ensure that Uruguay did not have 
to settle the case or withdraw the tobacco control measures 
being challenged.14 In the end the tribunal required PMI to 
pay Uruguay’s legal fees, however, this decision cannot be 
expected in all cases. The average cost of an ISDS case is US$8 
million with an upper range of US$30 million.15 This cost 
does not include the award of compensation which averages 
US$10 million.15 The procedural cost is estimated to be five 
times more than a state-state dispute within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system.10 
One of the challenges with a “reform” position is that solutions 
remain elusive and ultimately frivolous cases are impossible 
to preempt. One proposed solution is a voluntary carve-
out of tobacco from disputes under the TPP. Civil society 
organizations lobbied vigorously to have tobacco excluded 
from the ISDS chapter of the TPP in an attempt to quash 
future tobacco-related investor-state disputes. The exclusion 
of tobacco-related disputes in the TPP agreement was 
controversial even within the health community. First, despite 
the efforts to establish a “carve-out” the eventual text requires 
that countries opt-in to the exclusion of tobacco, meaning 
that some countries may choose to opt-out. In addition, the 
countries that chose to opt-in remain vulnerable to tobacco-
related disputes under other investment agreements (the 
“forum-shopping” problem). Pendas and Mathison point out 
that TPP members are party to almost forty IIAs and note that 
the text “suggests that previously signed (agreements) will 
then coexist, with the TPP Investment Chapter … trigger(ing) 
the potential for forum shopping for certain investors” (p 
161).16 Third, if ISDS is problematic for tobacco control, then 
it is likely problematic for governments attempting to regulate 
alcohol or unhealthy foods. Thus, some argue that tobacco 
“exceptionalism” ignores more general risks to regulation. 
While the tobacco “carve-out” symbolizes a general shift 
towards the recognition that governments must have the space 
to regulate in the public interest it also highlights the difficulty 
addressing the problematic aspects of the ISDS system. In 
other words, the proliferation of overlapping IIAs limits the 
value of making exceptions for one product in one agreement 
without attending to more systemic issues. 
It is clear that certain reforms could improve upon the existing 
ISDS system. Structural limitations of the current system 
include a lack of transparency (ie, prevents public access to and 
scrutiny of proceedings) and is costly.11 However, the central 
and irreparable dimension of ISDS is how firms use the system 
to achieve peripheral ends. Firms are profit maximizing and 
regulation is a threat to this bottom-line. Large firms have 
the capacity to use the system as a strategic tool to dissuade 
regulation, even if they know they will likely not “win” the 
case. The position I am taking does not discount the fact 
that investors must be able to seek remedy for legitimate 
grievances. The benefit of having domestic courts take on 
the sole responsibility for investment disputes is that it would 
immediately eliminate the duplication of legal costs incurred 
by states. For example, all of the tobacco-related investment 
disputes have involved domestic litigation in addition to 
claims filed through the ISDS system. 
A common rationale used to argue for ISDS reform and more 
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recently its elimination is that states must have the sovereign 
authority to regulate in the public interest.17 This is also a 
common rationale expressed by the public health community 
in response to challenges brought forward against tobacco 
regulation at the WTO. This type of argument fails to address 
the nuance of the contemporary context of global governance. 
In fact, investment agreements clearly permit states to regulate 
in the public interest and moreover the legality of investment 
agreements is derived from the fact that states consent to the 
provisions. It is important to recognize that sovereign states 
are known to behave in discriminatory and unlawful ways 
and should remain accountable to contractual agreements. If 
the public health community is to take up the position that 
ISDS must be eliminated, it will be important to develop more 
robust arguments that integrate nuance. The thrust of my 
argument is that domestic courts should serve this function 
and if domestic legal institutions cannot be trusted to provide 
this service then investors must be accountable for the risks 
taken. 
I anticipate that some may argue that the very existence of the 
ISDS system is premised on the fact that many domestic legal 
institutions cannot be trusted to rule impartially. In light of 
the information provided above, if stable and reliable domestic 
courts are relied upon to protect investor rights then states 
have incentive to construct strong rule of law. In other words, 
we might anticipate that the elimination of ISDS might create 
greater incentive to develop strong domestic institutions to 
attract investment. As noted above, the domestic institutional 
context has always been important to attract investment. One 
might also argue that if I am suggesting ISDS be eliminated 
then why not argue for the elimination of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, since many of the policy issues that lead 
to investment disputes also lead to trade disputes. I would 
respond by pointing out that the WTO dispute settlement 
understanding is a public international law institution that 
is oriented towards aligning domestic policy with the rules 
of the WTO agreements. This system is not designed to 
compensate firms, creating different incentives for dispute. 
Although dispute brought through the WTO system still 
brings procedural costs it is worth returning to the point that 
on average the procedural costs are five times higher in the 
ISDS system. 
Conclusion
Labonté and colleagues highlight one improvement embedded 
in the text of the TPP, which is that “investor’s expectations 
of future earnings alone are insufficient cause for a claim.”2 
Pendas and Mathison note that the TPP elevates the standard 
for indirect expropriation whereby measures taken to “protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety and the environment” are permitted.16 Again, the 
problem with a reform agenda is that no provision will preempt 
the filing of a frivolous dispute. As noted earlier, the legal merit 
of the case seems to be secondary to the use of ISDS to achieve 
peripheral ends. In this vein, Labonté and colleagues note, 
the TPP still does not go far enough in its structural changes. 
However, I am suggesting that maybe it is time for the public 
health community to explore a stronger position. To conclude, 
it is clear that firms continue to abuse the ISDS system by 
filing frivolous cases intended to create a hostile regulatory 
environment. Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions 
to this problem. The elimination of the ISDS system with a 
corresponding and systemic effort to create a global economy 
that is supported by just domestic legal institutions seems to 
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